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AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGY
abstract
In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment. 
Special attention is devoted to the importance of this notion both for human life in its social aspects 
(notably, the formation of group beliefs and the constituions of just joint commitments) and for social 
ontology (in particular, for the understanding of norm and institutions and of the intentionality of groups). 
Then, we briefly summarize the contents of the contributions collected in the issue.
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The present issue of Phenomenology and Mind, “Joint Commitment: Collective Intentionality, 
Norms and Justice”, originates from the Spring School “Joint Commitment: Collective 
Intentionality, Trust, and Political Obligation” which was organized by the research centres 
PERSONA (Research centre in phenomenology and sciences of the person) and CeSEP 
(Research centre in public ethics) and took place at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University in June 
15th-17th, 2015.
The keynote speaker was, of course, Margaret Gilbert, the philosopher of the “joint 
commitment”, whose recent book (Joint Commitment. How We Make the Social World, 2013) was 
deeply discussed in the days of the School. Moreover, the school was animated by seventeen 
speakers – among invited speakers and contributed papers – from ten different countries. The 
contributed papers were selected in a double-blind review process by international reviewers 
from four different countries. The days of the Spring School were rich of collaboration and 
fruitful discussions among young scholars and affirmed philosophers, and this volume collects 
the great part of the papers presented and discussed at the school.
Joint commitment is the key-concept labelled by Margaret Gilbert to understand what we are 
talking about when we speak of what we do, think and feel and of our values, conventions and 
laws, and therefore to comprehend the structure of our social world. Joint Commitment is a very 
powerful concept both for our personal and public lives: “How is one to understand the sense of 
unity, of connection, the sense of the collective ‘we’? Given disparate human beings with their 
own personal beliefs, strivings, and so on, what kind of unity is possible? When we talk about our 
goals, beliefs, values, and so on–what are we talking about?” (Gilbert 2013, pp. 5-6).
Throughout her writings, Gilbert argues that joint commitment is a fundamental part of 
human life, since it is at the core of fundamental everyday concepts (some of which, such 
as institutions, law, walking together, rights and obligations, helping behaviour, collective 
beliefs, actions and values, etc. are discussed in the contributions collected in this issue). 
As she puts it in her last book, her notion of joint commitment covers “a wide range of 
topics which fall the multifaceted domain of the philosophy of social phenomena” and help 
addressing “matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including 
ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and 
outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1).
In the opening contribution of this volume, “Joint commitment: what it is and why it matters”, 
Gilbert argues that the appeal to joint commitment can be justified by way of the “rights 
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argument”, that is, she argues that joint commitment is the most plausible source of the rights 
inherent in central social phenomena. This approach to the justification of joint commitment 
is important since it emphasizes that joint commitment has to be understood as the key-
concept in the explanation of the normativity of social phenomena. In doing so, Gilbert also 
suggests that social normativity has not to be confused with moral normativity. 
The other contributions collected in the present volume discuss, more or less directly, 
Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment and point out its implications or even, more simply, 
its connections, both in a positive and negative perspective, with several crucial issues for 
the social ontology research agenda. Think of the issue of collective beliefs and the variable 
level of personal commitment and freedom they may imply, to the phenomenon of groups’ 
intentionality and the different forms of collective mental states, acts and actions in it 
involved, to the problem of the extreme variety of normativity (not just moral vs. social 
normativity, but also different types of social normativity) and its relation with institutions, 
norms and laws, and also to the question of the ground of political obligation and political 
justice and their possible relation with joint commitments. Thus, we decided to organize the 
articles in the following four sessions: (i) Collective beliefs, (ii) Groups’ intentionality, (iii) 
Shared norms, (iv) Just joint commitments.
The contributions collected in Session 1, “Collective beliefs”, deal with Gilbert’s notion of 
group belief, with a special focus on the relation among individual and collective doxastic 
attitudes. 
In his contribution, “Augur augurem videns... Belief and make-believe in social life”, Wojciech 
Żełaniec focuses on the phenomenon of the “evanescence of the individual”, which 
characterizes our age and which he detect in Gilbert’s approach. Gilbert’s discourse concerning 
collective belief is dominated by the question whether the parties to the joint commitment 
behave in a certain way. On the contrary, “it is precisely that evanescent question – of whether 
the parties to a joint commitment (have to) believe severally that which they are jointly 
committed to believe – that is most interesting in the context of the ‘evanescence of the 
individual’”. Żełaniec suggests that in the complete lack of individual beliefs (i.e., if people are 
only educated to internalize the beliefs they are jointly committed to believe) we can have at 
best “pretended beliefs” leading to something like a “collective schizophrenia”.
Silvia Tossut’s paper, “On acting because of a joint commitment”, tackles the issue of the 
obliteration of the individual too, though she focuses on individual preferences. By using a 
game theoretical approach, Tossut shows that the Gilbert’s holistic interpretation of joint 
commitment entails the obliteration of individual preferences, and that this makes it irrational 
to abandon whatever joint commitment.
Leo Townsend, in his paper on “Joint commitment and collective belief: a revisionary 
proposal”, suggests a way out the debate between Gilbert and rejectionism (the thesis that 
gilbertean collective beliefs amount to acceptances). Townsend argues that Gilbert’s account 
should be revised by saying that when people are jointly committed to believe, “the sort of 
commitment forged is a commitment to p as true, not a commitment to having the belief that 
p”; thus, he argues for “a broadening of the notion of joint commitment to include collective 
doxastic commitments”.
Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl’s contribution, “Epistemic Authority and Manipulation: Exploring 
the ‘Dark Side’ of Social Agency”, is not directly concerned with collective beliefs, but 
tackles the related issue of the way in which people can manipulate each other beliefs. The 
author introduces the notion of “cognitive dissonance”, and analyzes an interesting case of 
manipulation, i.e. that of a beated woman. Rinofner-Kreidl's main concern is “to figure out 
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how the ideas of reason and (epistemic) authority are connected with the social constitution 
and self-understanding of the agents involved”, and she argues for a distinction between 
objective and social authority.
Session 2, “Groups’ intentionality”, deals with the relation between the groups and the 
individuals constituting them, in particular with the issue of the relation between genuine 
groups, which have joint or collective intentions, commitments, feelings, etc., and mere 
aggregates or sums of individuals. 
Adopting (even if implicitly) a very phenomenological attitude, Jacob Heim, in his paper 
“Commitments in Groups and Commitments of Groups”, takes seriously the existence of 
groups and focuses on the experience of groups’ commitments that we can have in everyday 
life. Heim shows that such experience is not reducible to that of the sum of the commitments 
of individual group members. First, Heim distinguishes between the individual level of 
commitments, owed to the group members, and the group level of commitments, which “the 
group as a single body owes either to itself or to some third party”. Second, Heim distinguishes 
between the content and the holder of a commitment: “even when individual-level and group-
level commitments have the same content, they are understood to have different holders”. 
These distinctions allow him to make sense of the experience of groups’ intentionality, and in 
particular of groups’ commitments, as such. 
Francesca De Vecchi’s contribution, “The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and 
the Sharing Value issue”, inquires the role played by values for the creation of social unity 
and groups and for their maintenance in existence. This is a topic quite neglected in social 
ontology and also in Gilbert’s social ontology of plural subjects. In referring to Max Schelers’ 
axiology, De Vecchi points out the need of a values account that adequately considers the 
contribution of shared and collective values for unifying and binding people together in stable 
groups.
Glenda Satne and Alessandro Salice focus on the phenomenon of “Helping behaviour and 
joint action in young children” and show that Warneken, Tomasello et alia’s (2006) attempt 
to explain helping behavior in young children assuming the validity of Bratman’s theory 
of shared intentions as the right explanation of joint actions, faces several problems. Satne 
and Salice suggest that instead of Bratman’s idea of “weak” interdependence, Tomasello et 
alia should better adopt a “robust” idea of interdependence, according to which “individual 
intentions are not based on individual intentions but are themselves dependent on collective 
intentions”. Such robust interdependence is adopted by those philosophers that describe the 
phenomenon of collective intentionality not as distributive, but rather as genuinely collective 
– that is, as the intentionality of a group, or of a we. Needless to say, among such authors, 
beside Raimo Tuomela and John R. Searle, there is, Margaret Gilbert with her account of joint 
commitment.
Gian Paolo Terravecchia’s “A Phenomenology of Social Stances” develops a phenomenology 
of social stances, that is of intentional acts of taking a position about something, and aims to 
show that Gilbert’s joint commitment account is grounded in just one or two of the several 
stances which may characterize collective acting. Terravecchia argues that joint commitment 
needs accepting or assenting, while there are at least other three stances to be discussed about 
the creation of collective phenomena. These are: refusing (or rebelling against), suffering, and 
making something one’s own. Very interestingly, indeed, Terravecchia points out that Gilbert (as 
other social ontologists and scientists) tends to reduce the phenomenon of acting together to 
the phenomenon of joint acting, in the sense of acting in accordance with someone, and to the 
corresponding joint commitments. Yet, in some cases of collective acting, such as rebellion, 
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without the presence of any common goal (at least, among opponents) or social obligation. 
Thus, Terravecchia concludes that if one aims to account of the phenomenon of collective 
acting, one should consider the several stances, that is, the complex reality, in which collective 
acting may be grounded.
The papers collected in the third session, “Shared Norms”, discuss, more or less directly, a 
common, general claim: normativity is said in many ways, and the normativity of social or 
shared norms is a very multifaceted phenomenon.
Francesco Guala’s paper tackles the problem of “The Normativity of Institutions” and argues 
against the main trend in social ontology (Gilbert included) to ground the normativity of 
institutions in collective intentionality. Guala’s claim derives from the assumption that 
there are different kinds of normativity and that in social ontology normativity is rather 
considered just as a product of collective intentionality. Thus, Guala argues that “many social 
institutions do not rely on normative commitments engendered by a joint intention”, “that 
there is a viable alternative theory of institutions, and that normativity plays a different role 
in this theory than the one it plays in the collective intentionality programme”. Guala shows 
that institutions are not necessarily characterized by the normativity of joint commitment, 
and holds that they are, rather, sets of rules in equilibrium, whose main function is to indicate 
actions promoting coordination and cooperation. “Each rule codifies a behaviour – a set of 
actions – that solves a problem of coordination”.
Joshua Keaton’s “The Social Impact Theory of Law” suggests that Gilbert’s work on the 
“normativity of joint commitment can help resolve the intractable debate on legal normativity 
in philosophy of law”, going beyond both Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem 
of legal normativity, by grounding it in moral facts, and Hart’s thesis that moral and legal 
obligations should be held distinct. Keaton proposes what he calls the Social Impact Theory (SIT), 
a substantial variation on the theme on Greensberg’s Moral Impact Theory (MIT), according 
to which the rules that institutions recognize, promulgate, enforce, and practice give rise to 
“legal obligations, which are just various descriptions and entailments of our pre-existing 
social commitments – legal normativity is just an expression of rational commitment to group 
decision-making”. Therefore SIT, like MIT, “has no need to posit a unique type of normativity”.
Seumas Miller’s “Joint Political Rights and Obligations” proposes a very interesting taxonomy 
of rights and obligations in moral, social and political spheres. Miller distinguishes between 
moral rights, which are natural rights because one possesses them by virtue of properties one 
has qua human being (think for instance to the natural moral right not to be tortured that 
is based on the human beings capacity to suffer physical pain), and institutional moral rights, 
which do not pre-exist to social institutions, but, rather, presuppose institutions, such as 
the moral right to vote. Moreover, Miller distinguishes between institutional moral rights and 
obligations (e.g. “the right to vote and the right to stand for office embody the human right 
to autonomy in the institutional setting of the state”) and institutional rights and obligations 
that are not moral (e.g. “the right to make the next move in a game of chess”: such right is 
“entirely dependent on the rules of chess and does not entail any moral element in it”). 
Finally, Miller introduces the category of joint moral rights and obligations, argues that “political 
rights and obligations are in large part joint (moral and institutional) rights and obligations”, 
and distinguishes them by individual rights and obligations. Very compellingly indeed, Miller’s 
taxonomy of rights and obligations aims to show that political rights and obligations may be 
both moral and joint, since they may depend both on properties we have qua human beings 
and on agreements and commitments individuals have freely decided to assume. In other 
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Lorenzo Passerini Glazel’s contribution on “Shared Norms and Nomotrophic Behaviour” 
focuses on the phenomenon of nomotrophic behaviour (a variation on the theme of Amedeo G. 
Conte’s nomotropic behaviour), described as the “behaviour which aims at the maintenance 
of a norm in the event of its infringement: it typically consists in a reaction to the (actual 
or possible) infringement of that norm”. “The idea underlying the concept of nomotrophic 
behaviour is that a social norm that is repeatedly infringed with no reaction may slowly 
‘atrophy’ and vanish (by ‘desuetude’); and that its atrophy may be countered through 
different forms of nomotrophic behaviour”. Very originally indeed, Passerini Glazel suggests 
to construe Gilbert’s (2005) (and Devlin’s (1959)) idea of “interventions in the lives of others 
when one thinks that the others’ behaviour is wrong”, and Niklas Luhmann (1972) concept 
of “reactions to disappointment of normative expectations” as cases of nomotrophic 
behaviour. According to Passerini Glazel, both rebukes and demands, in Gilbert’s sense, are 
forms of nomotrophic behaviour. Moreover, he points out the fruitfulness of the concept of 
nomotrophic behaviour for social ontology in elucidating the epistemological and ontological 
implications of such concept concerning, respectively, the questions of the inference of norms 
from action and of the existence of norms.
The fourth session, “Just Joint Commitments”, collects contributions dealing with the political 
consequences of joint commitment (where ‘political’ should be understood in a broad sense). 
All the authors of these papers deal with the ways in which joint commitment might be used 
to explain specific features of our societies and our living in society.
John Horton and Ryan Windeknecht hold that we do have associative political obligations, 
and argue against the thesis that such obligations are subordinate to principles of global 
redistributions (the “distributive objection”).  The authors show that the two both associative 
obligation and principles of global redistribution are morally relevant and that only the more 
extreme claims made by the proponents of the distributive objection should be rejected.
Roberta Sala builds on the realist claim that there are people within liberal-democratic 
societies whose lives are not inspired by liberal values, and argues that joint commitment is an 
answer to the question of how those people may not coercively adhere to liberal institutions. 
Sala suggests that joint commitment can help in explain the notion of ‘modus vivendi’, if we 
understand the latter as “a way to be involved (and not coerced) in a social enterprise, more or 
less willingly, generally aiming at a peaceful coexistence”.
In the last paper, Helen Lauer analyzes an important kind of collective endeavour: collusion. 
The author emphasizes the characteristics of collusion that illuminate some limits of Gilbert’s 
account of joint commitment. For example, the fact that it is not rational for colluding 
agents to mutually express their readiness to collusion. Lauer suggestion is that there are 
covert norms  and that collusion may be a rational response to prevailing covert norms; if we 
recognize this feature of the social environment, we have the possibility to understand (and 
correct?) “socially acceptable hypocrisy”.
Thanks to the efforts of all the authors, the volume as whole results in a very intensive and 
stimulating discussion on the joint commitment concept and on other similar and near 
concepts which, together with the “joint commitment”, constitute a conceptual map of the 
main interesting problems faced today by social ontology.
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